Tekoa Smith
Understanding Comics
Scott McCloud uses his professional and artistic medium to define the art of comics. The definition established in the beginning is comics are juxtaposed pictorial and other images in deliberate sequence, intended to convey information and/or to produce an esthetic response in the viewer (McCloud 9). This book was extremely interesting to me because I have never been a fan of comics. Honestly until this year and taking this class I wasn’t even aware of what a graphic novel was. If I were to pick up Art Spiegelman’s Maus a few months ago I would have just assumed it was an adult comic book.
Learning about and understanding comics is beneficial to understanding how we see ourselves and our own face. McCloud states that we see ourselves in everything. We assign identities and emotions where none exist (McCloud 33). Yet even though we are able to see ourselves in almost anything the visual we have of our own face is somewhat generic and cartoony. That is why comics have such an effect on so many worldwide. We are able to become the characters in the comic because the way we see ourselves is similar to the way the comics is drawn.
When reading comics our minds do the same automatic things they do in everyday life to understand the world around us. We fill in information that we know is there even though we can’t see it. McCloud uses the example that even though you cannot see his legs in the panel we assume that he has legs and they are below him. As far out as comics may seem to reality they are more closely related than most think. At least I thought before reading this book. Comics takes everything: time, senses, emotions, space, and represents them all with symbols; signifiers.
Monday, March 23, 2009
Sunday, March 22, 2009
Understanding Comics
Cory Matheny
Prof. Ellis
Literary Analysis
March 22, 2009
The central focus of “Scott McCloud’s Understanding Comics: The Invisible Art” seems to be an articulation of the origins and potential significance of, what he calls, ‘closure.’ For McCloud, the idea that comics mimic the processes of everyday cognition through the process of closure makes comics a unique media. As McCloud notes, Marshal McLuhan first theorized that comic books were one of two “cool” media – media that has the ability to ‘involve’ the audience. This phenomenon thus makes comics as a unique media that deserve more than passing pop-culture recognition.
Because of the process of closure the mind is forced to ‘fill-in’ the gaps and thus requires the mind to build a bridge, so to speak, from one frame to the next. This bridge which is built over the ‘gutter’ of the comic actually helps the mind to understand the flow of the strip, and to remain engaged in the process of reading. Because the mind is permitted to fill-in the gutter with whatever fill it chooses, the mind, according to McCloud, actually finds the movement from event to event, or scene to scene, less contrived that a ‘traditional’ media: the mind understands the movement of characters or plot as it deems appropriate. Further, because the mind is granted the power of choice it is continually involved in the process of creation. In this way the strip is never fully complete. Further, one could argue that a comic strip is an infinitely unfinished effort because the ‘final’ work is always and continually reinterpreted by each viewer.
Similarly, the comic strip ‘forces’ the reader in ‘involve’ themselves into the story because they are continually, and in varying ways, invited to envision themselves as the comic. McCloud notes that artists like Art Spiegelman purposefully place masks onto their characters so that the reader may understand that character from an infinite number of perspectives: the reader is invited to project h/er own expectations onto the character present in the work. However, as McCloud also mentions, the reader can be alienated from the same character or object if the artist chooses to ‘objectify’ the agent. According to McCloud, this is often done by providing the object with an abundance of detail relative to the background against which it may be placed. Thus, the artists may manipulate the reader and force/ allow the individual to be either active or passive in their participation depending on what the artists deems appropriate.
This pattern is further complicated by the interplay of images and words that, through the use of image based or language based abstraction(s) allows the reader to float in and out of participation. As an example, the artist may abstract language just as an image is reduced to a series of interpretive lines so that the reader is forced to infer what is or is not intended in the work. As McCloud articulates in his ‘cosmology of comic expression,’ (p. 52) the artists can chose the type and method of ‘closure’ s/he wishes so to generate the effect s/he envisions: abstract images, poetic language; base language realistic imagery etc.
Personally, I do not argue with McCloud’s understanding of the process of closure and how it is manifested in comics. However, and perhaps this is, more precisely, a critique of McLuhan, I do not understand the difference between Art Spiegelman and Ernest Hemmingway. If, as McCloud argues, Spiegelman’s art functions because of its use of closure and its subsequent manipulation of faces, language, and reader involvement than I question how these process differ from “Hills Like White Elephants.” In this short story Hemmingway allows the reader to become a voyeur, who, unaware of the origins of the argument that dominates the story, is invited to interpret, deduce, and, if all else fails, insert one’s own understanding so that the story may take shape around a, now, assumed narrative. True, this is not an example of closure, but it is a manipulation of the reader by the artists and it is the involvement of the reader at the behest of the artist.
Prof. Ellis
Literary Analysis
March 22, 2009
The central focus of “Scott McCloud’s Understanding Comics: The Invisible Art” seems to be an articulation of the origins and potential significance of, what he calls, ‘closure.’ For McCloud, the idea that comics mimic the processes of everyday cognition through the process of closure makes comics a unique media. As McCloud notes, Marshal McLuhan first theorized that comic books were one of two “cool” media – media that has the ability to ‘involve’ the audience. This phenomenon thus makes comics as a unique media that deserve more than passing pop-culture recognition.
Because of the process of closure the mind is forced to ‘fill-in’ the gaps and thus requires the mind to build a bridge, so to speak, from one frame to the next. This bridge which is built over the ‘gutter’ of the comic actually helps the mind to understand the flow of the strip, and to remain engaged in the process of reading. Because the mind is permitted to fill-in the gutter with whatever fill it chooses, the mind, according to McCloud, actually finds the movement from event to event, or scene to scene, less contrived that a ‘traditional’ media: the mind understands the movement of characters or plot as it deems appropriate. Further, because the mind is granted the power of choice it is continually involved in the process of creation. In this way the strip is never fully complete. Further, one could argue that a comic strip is an infinitely unfinished effort because the ‘final’ work is always and continually reinterpreted by each viewer.
Similarly, the comic strip ‘forces’ the reader in ‘involve’ themselves into the story because they are continually, and in varying ways, invited to envision themselves as the comic. McCloud notes that artists like Art Spiegelman purposefully place masks onto their characters so that the reader may understand that character from an infinite number of perspectives: the reader is invited to project h/er own expectations onto the character present in the work. However, as McCloud also mentions, the reader can be alienated from the same character or object if the artist chooses to ‘objectify’ the agent. According to McCloud, this is often done by providing the object with an abundance of detail relative to the background against which it may be placed. Thus, the artists may manipulate the reader and force/ allow the individual to be either active or passive in their participation depending on what the artists deems appropriate.
This pattern is further complicated by the interplay of images and words that, through the use of image based or language based abstraction(s) allows the reader to float in and out of participation. As an example, the artist may abstract language just as an image is reduced to a series of interpretive lines so that the reader is forced to infer what is or is not intended in the work. As McCloud articulates in his ‘cosmology of comic expression,’ (p. 52) the artists can chose the type and method of ‘closure’ s/he wishes so to generate the effect s/he envisions: abstract images, poetic language; base language realistic imagery etc.
Personally, I do not argue with McCloud’s understanding of the process of closure and how it is manifested in comics. However, and perhaps this is, more precisely, a critique of McLuhan, I do not understand the difference between Art Spiegelman and Ernest Hemmingway. If, as McCloud argues, Spiegelman’s art functions because of its use of closure and its subsequent manipulation of faces, language, and reader involvement than I question how these process differ from “Hills Like White Elephants.” In this short story Hemmingway allows the reader to become a voyeur, who, unaware of the origins of the argument that dominates the story, is invited to interpret, deduce, and, if all else fails, insert one’s own understanding so that the story may take shape around a, now, assumed narrative. True, this is not an example of closure, but it is a manipulation of the reader by the artists and it is the involvement of the reader at the behest of the artist.
Wednesday, March 18, 2009
Maus II Presentation Notes
Tekoa Smith
Stereotypes are too common in society. Groups or niches use descriptions to distinguish themselves from others; however, stereotypes are given to a group by an outsider. More often stereotypes are made from a derogatory generalization because the outsiders are fully unaware of the processes of a group. Stereotypes evolve from jealousy, hatred, and ignorance; all very negative traits. And believing in a stereotype is evidence of close-minded thinking as well as a sense of prejudice.
Spiegelman was able to use the stereotype given to the Jews by the Germans as vermin as a metaphor for the different categories people, individuals, were forced into because of differences beyond their control.
My undergrad roommate is a part of a well known national sorority. The women of the sorority have a stigma of being prudes, junior yuppies, Stepford Wives in training and just over all boring according to the standards of college life. A common nickname to degrade these women is Cake Bakers. Mostly by rival sororities, this sorority has had this long standing stereotype because of the kind of women that decide to be apart of the sisterhood. Most of the women, excluding my roommate however, were nothing like the Cake Baker stereotype. They were very open-minded, had bigger plans than marrying rich out of college and could party with the rest of us Frostburg Bobcats. I got to know these women through my roommate, classes, and Greek life events (being apart of a sorority myself).
These women were smart. So smart in fact they decided to use the stereotype to their advantage. As advertisement for the sororities Fall Rush all the women wore t-shirts with giant cakes on them and written above the cake was the question “Want a piece?” This tactic was cleaver to me because not only did they make light of the stereotype they showed rivals that they were not afraid. They proudly sported those red t-shirts around campus for the better part of the semester. They showed others that they couldn’t be kept down by ignorance. The t-shirts were effective because it made people ask questions. I forced people to open up to them to find get the story behind the shirt. And with getting the story behind the shirt you received the story of the sisterhood.
When a group is stereotyped individuality is non-existent. The group is a collective and all actions and ideals are the same throughout. But we know that is untrue. We know that they majority of the time not all blonde women are ditzy or have low IQs. We know of an elderly person with an impeccable driving record yet when we are behind an elderly person in traffic we curse their very well being. This is because we don’t know them individually. We haven’t had the time to look into their face. Or hear their views on the world compared to our own. The Nazi’s hated the Jews because of their faces but only after their faces all became the same to them. That is what stereotyping does. It blinds the barriers and borders that make us separate in a common collection. Once the stereotypes are erased the lines of the face become more defined.
Stereotypes are too common in society. Groups or niches use descriptions to distinguish themselves from others; however, stereotypes are given to a group by an outsider. More often stereotypes are made from a derogatory generalization because the outsiders are fully unaware of the processes of a group. Stereotypes evolve from jealousy, hatred, and ignorance; all very negative traits. And believing in a stereotype is evidence of close-minded thinking as well as a sense of prejudice.
Spiegelman was able to use the stereotype given to the Jews by the Germans as vermin as a metaphor for the different categories people, individuals, were forced into because of differences beyond their control.
My undergrad roommate is a part of a well known national sorority. The women of the sorority have a stigma of being prudes, junior yuppies, Stepford Wives in training and just over all boring according to the standards of college life. A common nickname to degrade these women is Cake Bakers. Mostly by rival sororities, this sorority has had this long standing stereotype because of the kind of women that decide to be apart of the sisterhood. Most of the women, excluding my roommate however, were nothing like the Cake Baker stereotype. They were very open-minded, had bigger plans than marrying rich out of college and could party with the rest of us Frostburg Bobcats. I got to know these women through my roommate, classes, and Greek life events (being apart of a sorority myself).
These women were smart. So smart in fact they decided to use the stereotype to their advantage. As advertisement for the sororities Fall Rush all the women wore t-shirts with giant cakes on them and written above the cake was the question “Want a piece?” This tactic was cleaver to me because not only did they make light of the stereotype they showed rivals that they were not afraid. They proudly sported those red t-shirts around campus for the better part of the semester. They showed others that they couldn’t be kept down by ignorance. The t-shirts were effective because it made people ask questions. I forced people to open up to them to find get the story behind the shirt. And with getting the story behind the shirt you received the story of the sisterhood.
When a group is stereotyped individuality is non-existent. The group is a collective and all actions and ideals are the same throughout. But we know that is untrue. We know that they majority of the time not all blonde women are ditzy or have low IQs. We know of an elderly person with an impeccable driving record yet when we are behind an elderly person in traffic we curse their very well being. This is because we don’t know them individually. We haven’t had the time to look into their face. Or hear their views on the world compared to our own. The Nazi’s hated the Jews because of their faces but only after their faces all became the same to them. That is what stereotyping does. It blinds the barriers and borders that make us separate in a common collection. Once the stereotypes are erased the lines of the face become more defined.
Monday, March 16, 2009
Maus II
Matt Bochniak
3/16/09
“Maus II”, by Art Spiegelman, offers readers a unique way of telling the story of the holocaust. Spiegelman’s choose to tell his story in a graphic novel. Using this format, the readers get a visual story that focuses on images rather then just the words.
The Book begins with Artie deciding on drawing Jews as mice. Spiegelman humanizes and personalizes certain animals throughout “Maus II”. The Jews were mice, German’s were cats, Russians were pigs, and the Americans were dogs. By just looking at these animals, naturally, you know who didn’t get a long. This is a great visual device so readers already know something about a character before the character is formally introduced to us.
When chapter two begins, the book takes a brief detour from the story. Spiegelman brings us into his studio as he works on “Maus II”. On page 41, we see Spiegelman drawing, but he is a human wearing a mouse mask. It doesn’t stop with just Spegelman, every human in the beginning of chapter two is wearing a mask that follows the humanized animals. This is so unique, that we are briefly out of the story but all of the characters still have faces of their animals. In an added bit of humor, on page 43, the last cell on the bottom right has a picture of a cat in his doctor’s office. An arrow points to the picture saying, “Framed photo of pet cat, really!” (p 43). That is just too funny, making sure the viewer doesn’t think it’s a picture of a German. Earlier on that same page, Spegelman mentions that his Doctor’s office is overrun with stray cats and dogs. Once again, in a bit of humor, a box says “Can I mention this, or does it completely loose up my metaphor?”(p 43).
“Maus II” is a new approach to a much told story. Spiegelman successfully tells a painful and tragic story in a way that anyone could understand. By using a graphic novel of animals, the story isn’t as personal.
3/16/09
“Maus II”, by Art Spiegelman, offers readers a unique way of telling the story of the holocaust. Spiegelman’s choose to tell his story in a graphic novel. Using this format, the readers get a visual story that focuses on images rather then just the words.
The Book begins with Artie deciding on drawing Jews as mice. Spiegelman humanizes and personalizes certain animals throughout “Maus II”. The Jews were mice, German’s were cats, Russians were pigs, and the Americans were dogs. By just looking at these animals, naturally, you know who didn’t get a long. This is a great visual device so readers already know something about a character before the character is formally introduced to us.
When chapter two begins, the book takes a brief detour from the story. Spiegelman brings us into his studio as he works on “Maus II”. On page 41, we see Spiegelman drawing, but he is a human wearing a mouse mask. It doesn’t stop with just Spegelman, every human in the beginning of chapter two is wearing a mask that follows the humanized animals. This is so unique, that we are briefly out of the story but all of the characters still have faces of their animals. In an added bit of humor, on page 43, the last cell on the bottom right has a picture of a cat in his doctor’s office. An arrow points to the picture saying, “Framed photo of pet cat, really!” (p 43). That is just too funny, making sure the viewer doesn’t think it’s a picture of a German. Earlier on that same page, Spegelman mentions that his Doctor’s office is overrun with stray cats and dogs. Once again, in a bit of humor, a box says “Can I mention this, or does it completely loose up my metaphor?”(p 43).
“Maus II” is a new approach to a much told story. Spiegelman successfully tells a painful and tragic story in a way that anyone could understand. By using a graphic novel of animals, the story isn’t as personal.
Sunday, March 15, 2009
Maus II
Cory Matheny
Prof. Ellis
First Signifiers
March 15, 2009
Maus II provided an interesting interpretation of the role and function of the human face in (ab)normal social interaction(s). Because Speigelman choose to tell Maus II as both a retelling of the Holocaust and as a telling of his own difficulty with the emotional residue of his family’s Holocaust experience the reader is privy to the function of the face as both a historical and personal marker. I draw a distinction between these two ideas – historical and personal – because each seems to offer sufficiently different understanding of the role and function of the human face to warrant an exclusive description of its potential significance.
The human face is one of those everyday experiences that is so thoroughly a part of our lives that it often loses meaning. It is normal to see the face on the street, on the television, in a magazine or across the way; it is normal to see the face speaking, it is normal – at times – to see another person’s face motionless. It, however, is decidedly un-normal to not see another person’s face. We watch other’s faces and we casually interpret its variations: laughter, sadness, make-up, Botox. But, we are always granted access to the face no matter how perverse it may be. This access, to the face, seems at a first glance to be of the utmost importance. Access to the face denotes that person’s willingness to be identified by other individuals living in a community.
Access to the face grants the viewer access, we seem to believe, to the individual. This is not to say that the individual does not exists if he or she lacks a face, only that the viewer is not given access to said individual. This may not seem problematic, but I would offer that the hood offers an illuminating example of the assumed role and function of the face. When an individual wears a hood they claim ‘non-participation.’ The hood does not grant the viewer access to the individual and thus does not carry the expectation of social participation. When terrorist – of any sort, Islamic-fundamentalists, KKK, ELF – wear a hood/ mask they are not allowing themselves to be identified by all other members of the community within which they are participants. This assumed, ghostlike, position allows the terrorist to be all things at all times: s/he is at once a person and a non-person – the Other in Lacan-ian terms. This Other may then act with impunity upon the community infinitely representing a threat to the stability and predictability of persons lives within that community. At the same time, the terror suspect is almost always given a hood to wear while incarcerated or, as photos from Guantanamo Bay have shown, tortured. This is hardly an effort on the part of the captors to comfort the prisoner, rather, if the prisoner is a non-entity, is unidentifiable as a person, unapproachable, as Levinas may have framed the argument, than that entity is more easily disregarded: more easily tortured. The hood allows the torturer to see the prisoner as a tangible Other that then can acted upon, that, to some extent can be controlled.
When Speigelman depicts the face as a caricature he permits the reader to glance, not at the page, but back into their own mind. The individual reader is able to project whatever image they wish upon either the Jews or the Germans the survivors and the dead. This projection then invests the reader in the story in a way in which they otherwise have not . If the reader is granted permission to impose h/er own experience onto the story than the history that it depicts at once becomes more real and more distant. The mask is able to mediate the experience of the story as a historical event for the reader. Similarly, as the story ends, and Speigelman offers the reader their first ‘true’ face – his father as prisoner – and thus forces the reader to glance back to the immediacy of the moment. As Levinas may have described the moment, the reader is now forced to face the obvious reality of the moment.
Thus, the use of the hood or mask to distort the face serves a multifaceted function. It simultaneously permits the individual and the viewer to distance themselves from the moment, but it also allows the hidden face to exists more subtly and more profoundly in the mind of the viewer. Subsequently, then, the historical and personal experience of the face are manipulated. Historically the face becomes a personal projection; personally the face, or lack thereof, becomes a threat. In the final analysis, the face, and our access to it, at least partially mediates our experience of one another, society, our the history of each.
Prof. Ellis
First Signifiers
March 15, 2009
Maus II provided an interesting interpretation of the role and function of the human face in (ab)normal social interaction(s). Because Speigelman choose to tell Maus II as both a retelling of the Holocaust and as a telling of his own difficulty with the emotional residue of his family’s Holocaust experience the reader is privy to the function of the face as both a historical and personal marker. I draw a distinction between these two ideas – historical and personal – because each seems to offer sufficiently different understanding of the role and function of the human face to warrant an exclusive description of its potential significance.
The human face is one of those everyday experiences that is so thoroughly a part of our lives that it often loses meaning. It is normal to see the face on the street, on the television, in a magazine or across the way; it is normal to see the face speaking, it is normal – at times – to see another person’s face motionless. It, however, is decidedly un-normal to not see another person’s face. We watch other’s faces and we casually interpret its variations: laughter, sadness, make-up, Botox. But, we are always granted access to the face no matter how perverse it may be. This access, to the face, seems at a first glance to be of the utmost importance. Access to the face denotes that person’s willingness to be identified by other individuals living in a community.
Access to the face grants the viewer access, we seem to believe, to the individual. This is not to say that the individual does not exists if he or she lacks a face, only that the viewer is not given access to said individual. This may not seem problematic, but I would offer that the hood offers an illuminating example of the assumed role and function of the face. When an individual wears a hood they claim ‘non-participation.’ The hood does not grant the viewer access to the individual and thus does not carry the expectation of social participation. When terrorist – of any sort, Islamic-fundamentalists, KKK, ELF – wear a hood/ mask they are not allowing themselves to be identified by all other members of the community within which they are participants. This assumed, ghostlike, position allows the terrorist to be all things at all times: s/he is at once a person and a non-person – the Other in Lacan-ian terms. This Other may then act with impunity upon the community infinitely representing a threat to the stability and predictability of persons lives within that community. At the same time, the terror suspect is almost always given a hood to wear while incarcerated or, as photos from Guantanamo Bay have shown, tortured. This is hardly an effort on the part of the captors to comfort the prisoner, rather, if the prisoner is a non-entity, is unidentifiable as a person, unapproachable, as Levinas may have framed the argument, than that entity is more easily disregarded: more easily tortured. The hood allows the torturer to see the prisoner as a tangible Other that then can acted upon, that, to some extent can be controlled.
When Speigelman depicts the face as a caricature he permits the reader to glance, not at the page, but back into their own mind. The individual reader is able to project whatever image they wish upon either the Jews or the Germans the survivors and the dead. This projection then invests the reader in the story in a way in which they otherwise have not . If the reader is granted permission to impose h/er own experience onto the story than the history that it depicts at once becomes more real and more distant. The mask is able to mediate the experience of the story as a historical event for the reader. Similarly, as the story ends, and Speigelman offers the reader their first ‘true’ face – his father as prisoner – and thus forces the reader to glance back to the immediacy of the moment. As Levinas may have described the moment, the reader is now forced to face the obvious reality of the moment.
Thus, the use of the hood or mask to distort the face serves a multifaceted function. It simultaneously permits the individual and the viewer to distance themselves from the moment, but it also allows the hidden face to exists more subtly and more profoundly in the mind of the viewer. Subsequently, then, the historical and personal experience of the face are manipulated. Historically the face becomes a personal projection; personally the face, or lack thereof, becomes a threat. In the final analysis, the face, and our access to it, at least partially mediates our experience of one another, society, our the history of each.
Monday, March 9, 2009
The Face
Matt Bochniak
3/9/09
The Face
This week’s readings were difficult for me. I have very little knowledge of philosophy, never taking a philosophy course as an undergraduate. With that being said, I thought that Emmanuel Levinas’s “Ethics and Infinity” was very interesting.
The first part that really captures my interests was the connection with the face and acts of violence. “The face is exposed, menaced, as if inviting us to an act of violence. At the same time, the face is what forbids us to kill.” (p 86) I believe Levina is pointing out an inherent contradiction. Facial expressions are what can drive a person to violence, but at the same time, a normal sane person couldn’t murder someone that is looking straight at them. The face is too personal and there is an immediate connection with that person looking at you. Philippe Nemo points out, “War stories tell us in fact that it is difficult to kill someone who looks straight at you.” (p 86)
In questioning the connection of the face and acts of violence, I have to say murderers that use guns have to look at their targets. Jus t this weekend, a shooter shot a minister in Illinois. This is why I added “sane” to my understanding of Levina’s theory.
Finally, I love Levina’s beliefs on being silent in someone’s presence. “It is difficult to be silent in someone’s presence; this difficulty has its ultimate foundation in this signification proper to the saying, whatever is the said. It is necessary to speak of something, of the rain and fine weather, no matter what, but to speak, to respond to him and already to answer for him.” (p 88) This is so true. To witness this, go on an elevator with strangers. There is an awkward silence while you’re on the elevator, and it is normally broken by someone talking about the weather. And I have to question, why the weather? What makes weather the one thing that everyone can talk about?
3/9/09
The Face
This week’s readings were difficult for me. I have very little knowledge of philosophy, never taking a philosophy course as an undergraduate. With that being said, I thought that Emmanuel Levinas’s “Ethics and Infinity” was very interesting.
The first part that really captures my interests was the connection with the face and acts of violence. “The face is exposed, menaced, as if inviting us to an act of violence. At the same time, the face is what forbids us to kill.” (p 86) I believe Levina is pointing out an inherent contradiction. Facial expressions are what can drive a person to violence, but at the same time, a normal sane person couldn’t murder someone that is looking straight at them. The face is too personal and there is an immediate connection with that person looking at you. Philippe Nemo points out, “War stories tell us in fact that it is difficult to kill someone who looks straight at you.” (p 86)
In questioning the connection of the face and acts of violence, I have to say murderers that use guns have to look at their targets. Jus t this weekend, a shooter shot a minister in Illinois. This is why I added “sane” to my understanding of Levina’s theory.
Finally, I love Levina’s beliefs on being silent in someone’s presence. “It is difficult to be silent in someone’s presence; this difficulty has its ultimate foundation in this signification proper to the saying, whatever is the said. It is necessary to speak of something, of the rain and fine weather, no matter what, but to speak, to respond to him and already to answer for him.” (p 88) This is so true. To witness this, go on an elevator with strangers. There is an awkward silence while you’re on the elevator, and it is normally broken by someone talking about the weather. And I have to question, why the weather? What makes weather the one thing that everyone can talk about?
The Face A Signifier
Tekoa Smith
3/9/09
The face is the most powerful form of communication. Facial expressions can communicate across cultures, countries and languages. But even an expressionless face can tell an entire history. I believe that I know my history, as well as my families, just because of my face. My face signifies me as an Other. Helping me to understand that I am different than all other people. That the emotions and things behind my face actual help to make my face what it is.
I often recollect being a child and having those "Is that me?" moments while starring in the mirror. I would get lost in the reflection of my face. Studying the outline and memorizing the structure. Picking out the parts that were significantly my mother or significantly my grandparents and which parts were all me. Lacan states the meaning of something is in its relation to another thing, but contrary the face is meaning all by itself. You are you (86). "Who am I?", "Is all there is to me is this face?"
After getting hired on the spot for my first after school job my mother told me I would never have a problem getting a job or being accepted because of the way I looked. At the age of 14 I took that as a great compliment but now at 23 I wonder how true that really was. And even if it is true, how relevant is it to anything that I've encountered in my life. Do looks rule the world? Looks undoubtedly fade so what is the use in giving them so much power. And placing power just because of one's face is unethical.
The interpersonal relation I establish with the Other, I must also establish with other men; (90). During and even now in my transition into adult I begin to wonder how much of my success is from my knowledge and experience or the things I'm not saying with my face. My friends find me crazy because I dread when people point out my looks. I don't want to be told I'm pretty. That statement holds nothing for me but that my face is symmetrical. Without consciences I reject all artificial power given to my face. Developing harsh biting language to outwardly express what my face contradicts.
I notice other people's faces. How their's differ from mine and with person's elder I realiz the difference is the expressions. People's face tell their history before a person opens their mouth. With the creation of history looks don't fade but are turned into experience. And often in the troubling time of life not all experiences are pretty. So in some ways I feel inadequate to the rest of the world because my face doesn't show those experiences. My face is green. It communicates nothing but that I have a long way to go.
3/9/09
The face is the most powerful form of communication. Facial expressions can communicate across cultures, countries and languages. But even an expressionless face can tell an entire history. I believe that I know my history, as well as my families, just because of my face. My face signifies me as an Other. Helping me to understand that I am different than all other people. That the emotions and things behind my face actual help to make my face what it is.
I often recollect being a child and having those "Is that me?" moments while starring in the mirror. I would get lost in the reflection of my face. Studying the outline and memorizing the structure. Picking out the parts that were significantly my mother or significantly my grandparents and which parts were all me. Lacan states the meaning of something is in its relation to another thing, but contrary the face is meaning all by itself. You are you (86). "Who am I?", "Is all there is to me is this face?"
After getting hired on the spot for my first after school job my mother told me I would never have a problem getting a job or being accepted because of the way I looked. At the age of 14 I took that as a great compliment but now at 23 I wonder how true that really was. And even if it is true, how relevant is it to anything that I've encountered in my life. Do looks rule the world? Looks undoubtedly fade so what is the use in giving them so much power. And placing power just because of one's face is unethical.
The interpersonal relation I establish with the Other, I must also establish with other men; (90). During and even now in my transition into adult I begin to wonder how much of my success is from my knowledge and experience or the things I'm not saying with my face. My friends find me crazy because I dread when people point out my looks. I don't want to be told I'm pretty. That statement holds nothing for me but that my face is symmetrical. Without consciences I reject all artificial power given to my face. Developing harsh biting language to outwardly express what my face contradicts.
I notice other people's faces. How their's differ from mine and with person's elder I realiz the difference is the expressions. People's face tell their history before a person opens their mouth. With the creation of history looks don't fade but are turned into experience. And often in the troubling time of life not all experiences are pretty. So in some ways I feel inadequate to the rest of the world because my face doesn't show those experiences. My face is green. It communicates nothing but that I have a long way to go.
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